In this paper we study the relationship between unions and growth in a two-sector overlapping generations model with altruism and human capital. This relationship depends on the interaction between the technology in the sector that produces human capital, the degree of unionization of the economy and the operativeness of the bequest motive.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between growth and the role of unions in a two-sector overlapping generations (OLG hereinafter) model with altruistic agents where endogenous growth is driven by the accumulation of human capital.
There are two branches of the literature to which our paper relates. The …rst one combines altruism and endogenous growth based on human capital accumulation as, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) . These authors present an OLG model where each parent has a bequest motive and values the quality of education passed on to the o¤spring. Eckstein and Zilcha (1994) develop a model where the human capital of the children is determined by the percentage of the leisure time that parents devote to their o¤spring. In a recent contribution, Zhang (1996) emphasizes the importance of the units of goods invested by the parent, the units of the parent's time spent, and the human capital of the parent on the human capital of the child.
The second branch of the literature addresses speci…cally the problem of unemployment in the context of growth models in unionized economies, but without taking altruism into account. 1 ' 2 Bean and Pissarides (1993) develop a search model where matching frictions create unemployment. They …nd out that the relationship between growth and the relative bargaining power of workers' is ambiguous, being the reason that the shift in income from entrepreneurs to workers could be compensated by an increase in savings, and therefore in the growth rate. The same result is achieved by de la Croix and Licandro (1995) in a model with irreversible decisions; they conclude that a raise in union power produces crowding-out of physical capital, but at the same time it raises the …rm's value, and the physical capital as well. This paper departs from these two approaches in the following sense. We develope a two-sector OLG model with intergenerational altruism and unions, where endogeneous growth is generated by human capital accumulation in the educational sector. The presence of altruism, in the sense that parents of a given generation will get utility from the utility of their o¤spring as the dynastic utility in Barro (1974) , allows us to generate di¤erent results depending on the operativeness of the bequest motive 3 . This framework allows two possible situations: in the …rst one, the production of human capital is given by a linear technology on human capital 1 Aghion and Howitt (1994) study the interaction between unemployment and growth in a one sector model, whereas van Schaik and de Groot (1995) analyse the same question in a two sector model. None of them includes unions. 2 Other models, that emphasize the e¤ect of unionisation on innovation and growth, are Ulph and Ulph (1994) and Acemoglu (1997) . 3 As an example, Caballé (1998) shows how economic growth rates change depending on the operativeness of the bequest motive, which in turn depends on the tax structure.
as in Uzawa (1965) or Lucas (1988) and thus, there is no physical capital in the educational sector. For this reason, we can analyse two economies: in the …rst one, the walrasian case, we face a competitive economy without unions, whereas in the second one there are unions in the sector that produces consumption goods. We …nd that the rate of growth is higher in the unionized economy than in the walrasian one, and this holds no matter the operativeness of the bequest motive. Higher wages in the unionized sector have two e¤ects: to increase the demand for physical capital and to decrease the quantity of labour hired in this sector. Unemployed labour in the consumption goods sector causes wages to decrease in the educational sector and thus higher returns from human capital investment. The amount of labour hired increases implying a higher production of human capital and, hence, a higher rate of growth. It is also worth to emphasize that the level of altruism that makes the physical bequest motive to be or not operative is the same in both the walrasian and the unionized economies. This means that the degree of unionization of the economy does not a¤ect the individual's decision about leaving physical bequests.
In contrast with the …rst situation, in the second one physical capital enters the production function for human capital accumulation as an input. This allows four possible cases: in the …rst one, the walrasian case, we face a competitive economy without unions, very much in contrast with the last one, where we …nd unions in each sector; there are two other similar, intermediate cases, with unions in one sector and none in the other (partially unionized economies). We show that, with strictly positive bequests, the rate of growth is higher in the walrasian case than in the completely unionized economy. The reason is that higher wages in both sectors in the fully unionized economy cause the total demand for labour to decrease, creating unemployment. The resulting fall in production more than o¤sets the increase in wages. However, the same conclusion might be reversed comparing the walrasian case to the partially unionized economies, that is, a partially unionized economy may grow faster than a walrasian economy. Higher wages in the unionized sector cause the demand for labour to decrease, but there is no unemployment because lower wages in the non-unionized sector increase the demand for labour. The overall e¤ect on the rate of growth is then ambiguous. In turn, when bequests are inoperative, we get a di¤erent result, in the sense that even fully unionized economies can grow at higher rates than competitive ones. When bequests are inoperative, parents devote more resources to their childrens' education, and since there are higher wages in both sectors in the fully unionized economy, these two e¤ects might o¤set the fall in production due to the unemployment caused by the existence of unions, compared to the walrasian economy with full employment but lower wages. In this context, the level of altruism that makes the physical bequest motive to be or not operative is di¤erent for the walrasian and the fully unionized economies. Thus, given a certain level of altruism, the union-ization degree a¤ects the rate of growth of the economy via two channels: the direct e¤ect on human capital investment and the indirect e¤ect on the operativeness of the bequest motive.
In the next section we present the basic model. Linear technology in the educational sector is discussed in section 3, whereas section 4 studies the introduction of physical capital in this sector. Section 5 concludes. All proofs and computations can be found in the Appendix.
The basic model
We construct a two-sector OLG model with constant population, whose mass is normalized to one, and where agents live for three periods. In the …rst period individuals obtain education bequest from their parents, which endows them with a human capital level h t . They are endowed with one unit of labour time that will be supplied inelastically in the second period, where they also receive a physical bequest b t from their parents and have a child. Then they decide about consumption C t in that period, the provision of education or human capital of their o¤spring h t+1 , and savings s t . In the third period they distribute the return from savings between consumption C t+1 and bequests to their o¤spring b t+1 . The utility of an individual born at t ¡ 1 is
where the superscript denotes the generation to which individuals belong, V t is the utility of their o¤spring, and¯> 0. The parameter ½ > 0 is the altruism factor. The unit of labor time inelastically supplied by an individual at time t becomes h t e¢ciency units of labor. Thus, the agent's labour income in the second period is w a t h t , where w a t is the average wage. Since there are two sectors in the economy and the wage paid in each sector may be di¤erent, individuals take the wage as the sum of the time they work in each sector times the wage earned in that sector. Note that w a t is the average wage across …rms, but each and every worker receives precisely w a t . Education is provided through schools or speci…c educational price-taker …rms. We normalize the price of consumption goods to one. Thus, consumer's budget constraints are:
where p t h t+1 is the total expenditure on the education of the o¤spring, p t is the price in goods of each unit of human capital acquired by the o¤spring in the school at period t, and r t+1 is the interest rate at t + 1. Maximizing
(1) subject to (2), (3) and b t+1¸0 is equivalent to solving the following problem:
In order to ensure that V ¤ t¡1 is bounded above and the solution we will …nd is the optimal one, we asssume ½ < 1.
There is a consumption goods sector in which each …rm produces according to the production function
where°1 2 (0; 1), K t is the capital employed by the …rm and L t = h t N t is the e¢cient labor which in turn equals the human capital of workers' h t times the time they are hired by the …rm N t . Since …rms are able to observe the level of skill of each worker and are price-takers, from the maximization problem of the …rm we have that factors are paid their marginal products:
where w t is the wage paid for one e¢ciency unit of labor by the …rm. From the above equalities we get
and the optimal capital-labour ratio
whereas the …rm's optimal labour demand is, as follows from (8):
This basic framework is shared by the two situations we discuss below. The …rst one is analysed in section 3 and presents a model where there is a linear technology in the human capital accumulation function. The second situation is presented in section 4, where physical capital enters the production function for human capital accumulation as an input.
Linear technology in the educational sector
We assume the existence of an educational sector, composed by price-taking …rms. We can interpret it as if individuals contracted the service of one educational …rm or school in order that their o¤spring receives a certain human capital level or education. Each educational …rm maximizes pro…ts p t h t+1 ¡ ¹ w t h t N t taking into account the way human capital accumulates (or its "production" function) h t+1 = µ ³ h t N t´, where N t is the time workers are hired by the …rm, ¹ w t is the wage paid for one e¢ciency unit of labor by the …rm, and µ is a positive parameter. Since the technology in this sector is linear, each …rm hires a positive and …nite quantity of labour if the following condition holds:
We consider two cases: in the …rst one, without unions, the wage per e¢cient unit of labour must be equal in both sectors for all …rms. Besides, all labor supplied is employed and unemployment does not exist. Thus N t + N t = 1 4 and w t = ¹ w t , which implies:
In the second case, where there are unions in the consumption goods sector, we assume one union per …rm which invests in physical capital before the wage bargaining takes place. Thus, the capital stock will be considered as a constant by unions and …rms when negotiating. In each period the union sets the wage taking into account that it will a¤ect the quantity of labor employed only in its …rm. Thus, the union cares about employment and compares the wage with the income a worker can get if negotiation fails (v t ). The union maximizes (w t ¡ v t ) h t N t subject to the labor demand given by (9). The optimal condition is given by
Analogous to Barth and Zweimüller (1995) , we assume that in equilibrium v t is the expected income that a worker may get over all the economy, i.e. the average income
Since the educational sector is not unionized, the wage in this sector is that inducing full employment, i.e. N t + N t = 1.
The following relationships are valid no matter whether we study the walrasian or the unionized economy. First, the amount saved by generation t equals the stock of physical capital at t + 1:
Second, w
that is, expected wage is equal to the sum of the time they work in each sector times the wage earned in that sector. 5 The problem for consumers is to solve (4). The …rst order conditions for s t and b t+1 are given by equations (16) and (17) respectively, and for h t+1 are (18W) and (18U) in the walrasian and the unionized economies respectively (see the Appendix):
When bequests are operative, the derivation of the steady-state rates of growth are as follows. Using (18W) and (18U), (16) and the fact that in steady-state
Introducing (7) and (14) into (19W) and (19U), and using (10):
In the walrasian equilibrium we have w t = w t and N t = 1 ¡ N t . Besides, if we evaluate in steady state, use from the human capital technology
W and divide by h t+1 , we can rearrange (20W) as
From (16) and (17) we can obtain
Equations (21), (22) and the production function for human capital accumulation allow us to get
The process of derivation of the steady-state rate of growth in the unionized economy (g U ) is similar to the one described above. The only di¤erence is that w t ³ N t ¡°1´= w t N t so that (23) becomes:
In the case of inoperative bequests, b t+1 = 0 and (17) holds with strict inequality. Combining (2), (3) and (16), we get
Substituting (25) into (2) for C t gives
Substituting (7), (14) and (15) into (26), and using (10) and the rule of human capital accumulation yields°1
Combining (27), (21) and the production function for human capital accumulation, we obtain
The process of derivation for the case of the unionized economy is similar to the one described above. The only di¤erence is that w t ³ N t ¡°1´= w t N t so that (28) becomes
We aim now at …nding the conditions under which parents leave positive physical bequests to their o¤springs in both the walrasian and the unionized cases.
De…ne ½ W and ½ U as the levels of altruism such that the non-negativity constraint is just binding in equilibrium, i.e. b = 0 and (17) holds with equality in the walrasian and the unionized economies respectively. Then from equations (22) and (27), and noting that both of them are valid in the unionized and the walrasian cases, we have
The fact that the critical level of altruism is the same in both the walrasian and the unionized economies means that the degree of unionization of the economy does not a¤ect the individual's decision about leaving physical bequests.
In principle, we should expect that agents are more likely to leave bequests when ½ is high, and viceversa, and this is in fact stated in the next propositions.
Proposition 1 If ½ · ½ then b = 0 in the balanced growth path of both the walrasian and the unionized economies.
Proposition 2 If ½ > ½ then b > 0 in the balanced growth path of both the walrasian and the unionized economies.
What the above propositions tell us is that when individuals care little about their children, they leave them zero physical bequests. In turn, when individuals' concern about their children is high, bequests will be positive.
The comparison between the rates of growth in both cases is summarized in the following proposition.
Proof. Direct comparison between (23) and (24) and between (28) and (29).
Higher wages in the unionized sector has two e¤ects: to increase the demand for physical capital and to decrease the quantity of labour hired in this sector. Unemployed labour in the consumption goods sector causes wages to decrease in the educational sector and thus higher returns from human capital investment. The amount of labour hired increases, implying a higher production of human capital and, hence, a higher rate of growth.
Physical capital in the educational sector
In this section we introduce a di¤erent rule of human capital accumulation in the educational sector. Each educational …rm maximizes pro…ts p t h t+1 ¡ ¹ w t h t N t ¡(1 + r t ) ¹ K t taking into account the way human capital accumulates
, where ¹ K t is the capital employed by the …rm, N t is the time workers are hired by the …rm,°2 2 (0; 1), ¹ w t is the wage paid for one e¢ciency unit of labor by the …rm, and µ is a positive parameter. The optimality conditions are:
from where
The optimal capital-labour ratio is
whereas the …rm's optimal labour demand is, as follows from (34):
The following relationships are valid no matter which of the four types of equilibria we study. First, we have expected wage as de…ned in (15). Second, the amount saved by generation t equals the stock of physical capital at t+1:
Finally, by arbitrage the interest rate must be equal in both sectors. Therefore, from (5) and (31),°1
From the consumer's maximization problem (4), we obtain the …rst order conditions (16) and (17) for s t and b t+1 respectively, and the following equation for h t+1 (see the Appendix).
We analyse four possible situations: walrasian equilibrium (no unions), one union in one of the sectors and none in the other, and …nally, a fully unionized economy (unions in both sectors). We assume that …rms invest in capital before the wage bargaining takes place. Thus, the capital stock will be considered as a constant by unions and …rms when negotiating.
Let us analyse now the derivation of the steady-state rates of growth when bequests are operative in each of the four cases. In the walrasian case, without unions, the wage per e¢cient unit of labour must be equal in both sectors for all …rms. Besides, all labor supplied is employed and unemployment does not exist. Thus N t + N t = 1 and w t = ¹ w t :
Combining this equality and (37) we obtain that
which combined with (39) gives
From (41) and after some manipulations (see the Appendix) we get the expression for the steady-state rate of growth of this economy
In the second case, with unions in the consumption goods sector, the bargaining process is the same than in the previous section. Thus, (12) and (13) are still valid. Besides, since the educational sector is not unionized, the wage in this sector is that inducing full employment, i.e. N t + N t = 1. Plugging (6) and (32) into (13) for w t and w t respectively:
which combined with (37) gives
Combining the last equality and (42) results in
The derivation of the steady-state rate of growth G G = G G (µ; ½;°1;°2) from the last equation is straightforward (see the Appendix).
Proposition 4 Given (½;°1;°2) 2 -= (0; 1)£(0; 1)£(0; 1), there exist two disjoint open subsets with positive measure, -1 and -2 , such that
Higher wages in the consumption goods sector have two e¤ects: to increase the demand for physical capital and to decrease the quantity of labour hired in this sector. Unemployed labour in the consumption goods sector causes wages to decrease in the educational sector, and thus the amount of labour hired increases and the demand for physical capital decreases. The overall e¤ect on the returns from human capital investment depends on the elasticities of productive inputs.
In the third case, with unions in the educational sector, the union maximizes ( ¹ w t ¡ v t ) h t N t subject to the labor demand of the …rm, given by (35), and the outcome is
Using v t = w a t , (45) becomes
Since the consumption goods sector is not unionized, there is full employment, i.e. N t + N t = 1. From this last equality and substituting (6) and (32) into (46) for w t and w t respectively:
Combining (47) and (48), we obtain
; (49) from where we get the steady-state rate of growth G E = G E (µ; ½;°1;°2) (see the Appendix).
Proposition 5 Given (½;°1;°2) 2 ª = (0; 1)£(0; 1)£(0; 1), there exist two disjoint open subsets with positive measure, ª 1 and ª 2 , such that
Higher wages in the educational sector have two e¤ects: to increase the demand for physical capital and to decrease the quantity of labour hired in this sector. Unemployed labour in the educational sector causes wages to decrease in the consumption goods sector, and thus the amount of labour hired increases and the demand for physical capital decreases. The overall e¤ect on the returns from human capital investment depends on the elasticities of productive inputs.
Finally, the fourth case presents a situation where all …rms in both sectors are unionized. The bargaining process is the same than the one described above for the partially unionized economies. Thus, we can combine equations (12) and (45) to get
and substituting it into (46) we obtain
From (50), (6) and (32) we have
Combining this equality and (37) we obtain
From the last equality, substituting in (52) for
from where we get the steady-state rate of growth G U = G U (µ; ½;°1;°2) (see the Appendix).
The existence of unions in both sectors increases wages, and thus the demand for labour in both sectors decreases and the demand for capital increases. However, the fall in production due to the lower amount of labour employed o¤sets the former e¤ect, which in turn implies that the growth rate of the fully unionized economy is unambiguously lower.
Let us consider now the situation in which bequests are inoperative, i.e. b t+1 = 0. Unfortunately, the problem is not easily tractable, and we focus on the particular parameter con…guration°1 =°2 =°, and the walrasian and the fully unionized economies 6 . Though we lose information about steady-state growth rates, this simplifying assumption still will allow us to see how the results di¤er. The most important one indicates that the steady-state rate of growth of the fully unionized economy can be higher than the walrasian steady-state growth rate. This result is in contrast with the …ndings in proposition 6 because we obtain that even fully unionized economies can grow faster than competitive economies.
It is interesting to characterize the case b t+1 = 0 in terms of the altruism factor ½ given the intuition that relates this parameter and the "willingness" to leave bequests. Solving for the critical levels of altruism (see the Appendix), we obtain ½ ¤ W = ½ ¤ W (°;¯) and ½ ¤ U = ½ ¤ U (°;¯) for the walrasian and the fully unionized economies, respectively.
In principle, we should expect that agents are more likely to leave bequests when ½ is high, and viceversa. What proposition 8 tells us is that when individuals care little about the utility of their children, they leave zero physical bequests. Whereas, when individuals' concern about their children's utility is high, bequests will be positive. The same results apply for the fully unionized economy. When bequests are inoperative, the solution to the consumer's maximization problem yields (see the Appendix) G W C = G W C (µ;°; ½;¯) and G U C = G U C (µ;°; ½;¯), where the subindex C denotes that is evaluated when bequests are zero.
Proposition 10 When bequests are inoperative (i.e. ½ < ½ ¤ W ) and°1 =°2 =°, then, given (°; ½;¯) 2 © = (0; 1) £ (0; 1) £ (0; 1), there exist two disjoint open subsets with positive measure, © 1 and © 2 , such that
The intuition behind this result is that when the economy is fully unionized, wages in both sectors increase, which in turn implies lower returns from human capital investment. At the same time, we have zero bequests, implying that agents increase the proportion of their income they devote to their childrens' education. Hence, the overall e¤ect on the rate of growth is ambiguous.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the relationship between growth and the role of unions in a two-sector OLG model with altruistic agents where endogeneous growth is generated by human capital accumulation in the educational sector.
This framework allows two possible situations: in the …rst one, the production of human capital is given by a linear technology on human capital and thus, there is no physical capital in the educational sector. For this reason, we can analyse two economies: in the …rst one, the walrasian case, we face a competitive economy without unions, whereas in the second one there are unions in the sector that produces consumption goods. We …nd that the rate of growth is higher in the unionized economy than in the walrasian one, and this holds no matter the operativeness of the bequest motive. It is also worth to emphasize that the level of altruism that makes the physical bequest motive to be or not operative is the same in both the walrasian and the unionized economies. This means that the degree of unionization of the economy does not a¤ect the individual's decision about leaving physical bequests.
In contrast with the …rst situation, in the second one physical capital enters the production function for human capital accumulation as an input. This allows four possible cases: in the …rst one, the walrasian case, we face a competitive economy without unions, very much in contrast with the last one, where we …nd unions in each sector; there are two other similar, intermediate cases, with unions in one sector and none in the other (partially unionized economies). We show that, with strictly positive bequests, the rate of growth is higher in the walrasian case than in the completely unionized economy. However, the same conclusion might be reversed comparing the walrasian case to the partially unionized economies, that is, a partially unionized economy may grow faster than a walrasian economy. In turn, when bequests are inoperative, we get a di¤erent result, in the sense that even fully unionized economies can grow at higher rates than competitive ones. In this context, the level of altruism that makes the physical bequest motive to be operative or not is di¤erent for the walrasian and the fully unionized economies. Thus, given a certain level of altruism, the unionization degree a¤ects the rate of growth of the economy via two channels: the direct e¤ect on human capital investment and the indirect e¤ect on the operativeness of the bequest motive.
Appendix ² Consumer's problem in the case of linear technology in the educational sector
We explain how to get equations (16), (17), (18W) and (18U). The FOC for s t (16) is straightforward from (4). To obtain the FOC for b t+1 , (17), we di¤erentiate (4) to getC
Using the envelope theorem in (4) shifted one period ahead, we have
yields the FOC (17). To obtain (18W) and (18U), the FOC for h t+1 , we di¤erentiate (4) to obtain
Using the envelope theorem in (4) shifted one period ahead, we get
From the human capital accumulation function,
In the walrasian case, w t = w t and N t = 1 ¡ N t . From …rms' pro…t maximizing conditions, plugging (6) into (15) and di¤erentiating with respect to h t+1 yields @w a t+1
In the unionized economy, w t ³ N t ¡°1´= w t N t and N t = 1 ¡ N t . This, together with (6) into (15) and di¤erentiating with respect to h t+1 yields @w a t+1
From (5) we can obtain
(A.7) Plugging equations (15), (A.5), (A.6W), (A.7) and (A.3) shifted one period ahead into (A.4) yields
and (A.8W) into (A.3) for
gives the FOC (18W). Plugging equations (15), (A.5), (A.6U), (A.7) and (A.3) shifted one period ahead into (A.4) yields
and (A.8U) into (A.3) for
gives the FOC (18U).
² Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of the next two propositions is done below for the walrasian case. We skip the proof in the unionized case because of its similarity. Before proceeding with the proof, we will rewrite (16) and (17) in a more convenient way. From (16), (2), (3) and (14) we get
From (A.9), use w a t = w t = w t , equations (5), (6), (10) and the rule of human capital accumulation, and divide by h t+1 N t+1 to obtain in steady state
where k is the capital-e¢cient labour ratio, g = g W and N = N W but we supress the superindex for an easier treatment. From (16), (17) and (5), we get in steady state g¸½°1k°1 ¡1 : (A.11)
To prove the proposition we proceed by contradiction (see Caballé 1995) . Suppose the proposition is false, that is, ½ · ½ and b c > 0. Then the equilibrium triplet (g c ; k c ; b c ) must satisfy .12) and (A.11) holds with equality. De…ne k as the unique positive solution when the non-negativity constraint is just binding in equilibrium, i.e., b i = 0 for all i and (A.11) holds with equality. Hence, the associated savings function (A.10) becomes
Given that b c i > 0 for all i, from (A.12) and (A.13) we have
¡1 g :
which yields a contradiction. Therefore, (g c ; k c ) cannot characterize a balanced equilibrium path with positive physical bequests.
² Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the proposition is false, i.e., ½ > ½ and b c i = 0 for all i. Then (A.11) holds with inequality:
By the de…nition of ½ we get
Clearly, since ½ > ½, from (A.14) and (A.15) it follows that
Since b c i = 0 for all i, from (A.10), we have
From (A.13) and (A.17) we obtain
which contradicts (A.16).
² Consumer's problem in the case of physical capital in the educational sector
From problem (4), the …rst order conditions (FOC's) for s t , b t+1 and h t+1 are given by equations (16), (17) and (38) respectively. The derivation of (38), the FOC for h t+1 , is as follows. From the human capital accumulation function,
From …rms' pro…t maximizing conditions, plugging (6) and (32) into (15) and di¤erentiating with respect to h t+1 yields .19) and from (31),
Equations (A.18), (A.19),(A.20) and (A.3) shifted one period ahead into (A.4) yields .21) and (A.21) into (A.3) for
gives the FOC (38). Now we rearrange (38) to get a tractable equation; from (16) and (17) we get
Plugging (16) shifted one period ahead and (A.22) into (38) and after rearranging
Now we try to get rid of s t+1 in (A.23). Combining equations (7), (33) and (36)
Substituting (A.24) into (A.23) for s t+1 yields
² Derivation of the steady-state rate of growth G
W
In the competitive equilibrium we have w t = w t and N t = 1 ¡ N t . Besides, 1 + r t+1 = G W ½ from (A.22), and we can rearrange (A.25) as
Substituting (A.26) into (41) for p t and using
from the human capital accumulation function, we obtain
(A.27) In the balanced growth path, the steady-state growth rate is given by
Now, in order to …nd N W in steady-state, from (A.23) and (A.24) , we get
From the human capital accumulation function and (32), we have that
; hence, (A.29) becomes
½ for all t, and dividing by h t¡1 
Substituting (A.32) into (44) for p t and after some manipulations yields, in steady-state:
Reasoning as in the previous case to …nd out N G in steady-state:
Equations (A.33) and (A.34) de…ne the rate of growth in this economy G G = G G (µ; ½;°1;°2).
² Proof of Proposition 4
Substituting (A.31) into (A.28) and (A.34) into (A.33) for N W and N G respectively would give us G W and G G as a function of the parameters of the model, and direct comparison between these two rates of growth yields that (½;°1;°2) 2 -1 if
Equivalently, (½;°1;°2) 2 -2 if the above inequality does not hold.
E
The derivation is similar to that of G W , getting: .35) where
Equations (A.35), (A.36) and (A.31) de…ne the rate of growth of this economy G E = G E (µ; ½;°1;°2).
² Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing (A.35) to (A.28) using (A.36) and (A.31) to get rid of N E and N W would yield that (½;°1;°2) 2 ª 1 if
Equivalently, (½;°1;°2) 2 ª 2 if the above inequality does not hold.
² Derivation of the steady-state rate of growth G U
The derivation follows the reasoning for that of G W , getting: .37) where
Equations (A.37), (A.38) and (A.31) de…ne the rate of growth of this economy G U = G U (µ; ½;°1;°2). Note that there exists unemployment in this case, given by
Directly comparing (A.37) and (A.28) using (A.38) and (A.31).
² Derivation of the critical levels of altruism ½ ¤ W and ½ ¤ U and proof of Lemma 7
Consider the limiting case in which b t+1 = 0 but the …rst order condition (17) is just binding. Let us restrict our attention to the steady-state of the walrasian case. Equation (A.22) implies
where the star denotes that is evaluated when bequests are zero. From (5), (40) and the human capital accumulation function, we obtain Noting that k = k, from equations (2), (3), (16), (32), (36), (40) shifted one period ahead, the rule for human capital accumulation and dividing by h t+1 N t+1 we can obtain:
(A.44) From (15), (16) and (17) ² Derivation of the steady-state growth rates when b t+1 = 0
In the case of inoperative bequests, b t+1 = 0 and (18) holds with strict inequality. Combining (2), (3) and (16) = G W C , substituting for s t from (A.24), and using p t h t+1 = wthtN t 1¡°2 ,°1 =°2 =°, w t = w t = w for all t, N t = 1 ¡ N t and dividing by h t ,°1 (1 ¡°) 1¡2°> 0. Equivalently, (½;°1;°2) 2 © 2 if the above inequality does not hold.
